We study the problem of torts in a framework where a firm's accident adversely impacts all firms in the industry because of the presence of industry reputation effects. Industry reputation effects lead to interdependence among firms and give rise to strategic firm behavior. We characterize the industry equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration in such a setting. We then elucidate how the presence of industry reputation effects and the introduction of a liability regime in the form of a strict liability rule determine whether industry equilibrium is aligned or misaligned with the socially optimal industry configuration. Our results show that both the impact of industry reputation effects and the impact of the strict liability rule are in general contingent on the specifics of the tort problem at hand. In particular, we find that the presence of industry reputation effects can substitute for a suboptimal liability regime and that, in the presence of industry reputation effects, the introduction of the strict liability rule may be detrimental by steering the industry equilibrium away from the socially optimal industry configuration.
Introduction
When a firm's accident casts a negative light on rival firms, firms in the industry find themselves "tarred by the same brush" (King et al., 2002:393) . The Union Carbide accident in Bhopal, India, "damaged public perception of the entire chemical industry" (King et al., 2002:394) . The Exxon Valdez oil spill "affected all members of the petroleum industry" (King et al., 2002) . The Three Mile Island incident "was caused by the missteps of a single firm at a single facility, but the reputation of the entire power industry was harmed" (King et al., 2002) .
That one firm's mistake may "soil the reputation of an entire industry" (Barnett, 2007:7) has been well acknowledged in the recent literature on organizational behavior and management (see, e.g. King et al., 2002; Barnett, 2007; Yu et al., 2008; Barnett and Hoffman, 2008) . Drawing on theories of bounded rationality and social categorization, this literature argues that industry stakeholders (consumers, employees, and investors) possess limited cognitive capacity to process the available external stimuli and, therefore, use simplified mental models to classify industry members (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001 ). Engaging in a process of "commensuration" (Espeland and Stevens, 1998) , whereby otherwise unique entities (firms) are evaluated according to a common metric, stakeholders observing an industry member experience a crisis minimize their downside risk by taking actions (withdrawing consumption, employment, and investment) that result in punishment of all firms in the industry. Hence, a firm-specific large-scale accident event can adversely impact all other industry members (King et al., 2002; Yu et al., 2008) .
The existence of negative industry-wide spillover effects as a consequence of firm-specific accidents has been documented empirically using data from a variety of industries. Barnett and King (2008) and Barnett (2007) , respectively, show that, following the Bhopal accident, stock prices of all chemical firms decreased and exhibited greater volatility. Hill and Schneeweis (1983) document that, after the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident, all other nuclear utilities experienced significant negative abnormal returns. Mitchell (1989) discerns negative stock price effects for the entire drug industry as a consequence of the Tylenol poisonings. Bosch et al. (1998) find that, in the event of an airline crash, non-crash airlines with no market overlap with the crash airline earn noteworthy negative abnormal returns.
Data on product recalls likewise suggest that stakeholders consider recall announcements by specific manufacturers as information about industry-wide safety and that negative industry-wide spillover effects may be substantial. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) show that recalls in the auto and pharmaceutical industry, respectively, lead to non-recall auto and pharmaceutical firms suffering stock market losses. Freedman et al. (2012) provide evidence that toy recalls cause a decrease in the unit sales of toys produced by manufacturers that did not experience any recalls. Cawley and Rizzo (2008) find that prescription drug withdrawals result in a decrease in the utilization of other drugs within the same therapeutic class. 1 Despite the abundance of empirical evidence, however, the possibility that firm behavior may be influenced by industry reputation effects has thus far not been explored analytically in the context of the problem of torts.
2 To fill this gap in the literature, we develop a simple model of torts to study firm behavior in the presence of industry reputation effects. We aim to shed light on the following questions: How does the presence of industry reputation effects shape firms' decision to invest in precaution? What is the socially optimal industry configuration in the presence of industry reputation effects? How does the equilibrium industry configuration, resulting from non-cooperative decision-making of firms, in the presence of industry reputation effects compare with the socially optimal industry configuration? How do industry reputation effects and a liability regime determine the extent of alignment (or misalignment) between the equilibrium and socially optimal industry configuration? When firms in the industry share a common reputation, a firm's investment in precaution not only reduces the firm's likelihood of an accident, and thus the firm's expected damage compensation costs, but also decreases the expected costs from diminished industry reputation for every firm in the industry. In the presence of industry reputation effects, firms' fates are, therefore, "intertwined" (Barnett and King, 2008:1152) and a firm's decision to invest in precaution isunlike in the conventional model of torts (see, e.g. Shavell, 2004 :Sec. II, 2007 Cooter and Ulen, 2012:Ch. 6,7; Miceli, 2008: Ch. 2,3) -inherently strategic. 3 Drawing on the above insight, we first characterize the Nash equilibrium of a static game with complete information in which identical firms comprising the 1 Related accounting literature provides evidence that accounting misstatements, which negatively affect shareholder wealth at the restating firm, induce share price declines among nonrestating firms within the same industry (see, e.g. Xu et al., 2006; Gleason et al., 2008) . Negative spillover (or "contagion") effects have also been uncovered, for example, in the context of bankruptcy (Lang and Stulz, 1992) , lawsuits (Hertzel and Kiholm Smith, 1993; Prince and Rubin, 2002) , banking (see, e.g. Park, 1991) , and the market for government debt (Landon and Smith, 2000) . 2 The standard law-and-economics model of torts is developed, for example, in Shavell (2004 Shavell ( , 2007 , Cooter and Ulen (2012) , and Miceli (2008) . 3 Unlike in the context of torts where victims are third parties, models of strategic firm interaction are naturally more common in the literature on products liability and market structure (see, e.g. Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983). industry are choosing between investing and not investing in precaution in the presence of industry reputation effects. We show how the structure of the industry equilibrium is determined by the cost of precaution, expected liability damages, and industry reputation effects. We clarify why an empirically plausible characterization of industry reputation effects may, in some cases, give rise to multiplicity of industry equilibria.
We next characterize the socially optimal industry configuration in the presence of industry reputation effects. Because firms' expected losses from diminished industry reputation give rise to net social costs, the socially optimal industry configuration may entail a portion of the industry investing in precaution even if the cost of precaution exceeds the expected accident-related social harm -a scenario when in the absence of industry reputation effects the socially optimal industry configuration would have entailed no firm investing in precaution.
We then contrast the equilibrium industry configuration with the socially optimal industry configuration. Specifically, we highlight how the two institutional mechanisms shaping firms' incentives -liability regime in the form of a strict liability rule and industry reputation effects -influence whether the equilibrium industry configuration is aligned or misaligned with the socially optimal industry configuration.
We find that, in certain scenarios, the presence of industry reputation effects can substitute for a suboptimal liability regime. This occurs when in the absence of a common industry reputation the industry equilibrium entails too few firms investing in precaution. The existence of a common industry reputation then provides the missing incentives for firms to invest in precaution, steering the equilibrium toward the socially optimal industry configuration. In another scenario, however, the presence of industry reputation effects can have the exact opposite effect -it can push the industry equilibrium away from the socially optimal industry configuration. This occurs when in the absence of a common industry reputation the industry equilibrium with no firm investing in precaution would have coincided with the socially optimal industry configuration.
A qualitatively similar pattern of conclusions emerges when we examine the other dimension of the interaction between industry reputation effects and the law: the impact of the introduction of a strict liability rule given the existence of industry reputation effects. The introduction of strict liability can align the industry equilibrium with the socially optimal industry configuration when in the absence of a liability regime industry reputation effects are too weak to provide adequate incentives for firms to invest in precaution. When the socially optimal industry configuration in the presence of industry reputation effects entails only a portion of firms investing in precaution, however, providing further precaution-taking incentives through the introduction of strict liability may steer the industry equilibrium away from the socially optimal industry configuration.
In sum, our findings suggest that the impact of industry reputation effects crucially depends on the specifics of the tort problem at hand and that the introduction of a liability regime in the presence of industry reputation effects is not necessarily beneficial.
This article relates to a recently revived literature exploring whether market forces may act as a disciplining mechanism ensuring socially desirable investment in precaution, and thus complement or even substitute for law and regulation (Polinsky and Shavell, 2010; Rubin, 2011; Viscusi, 2011) . 4 Within this literature, Ganuza et al. (2013) study analytically how product liability and relational contracting, leading to firm-level reputation effects, interact in influencing a firm's incentives to exert care. Cooter and Porat (2001) and Iacobucci (2012) examine the interplay between legal and firm-specific reputational sanctions, focusing on the question of socially optimal legal damages. 5 Deffains and Fluet (2013) analyze the complementarity of legal liability and individual-specific moral concerns. Baker and Choi (2013) contrast privately-developed formal and market-based (reputational) sanctions in a setting where a long-lived firm sells to a sequence of shortlived customers. Unlike these contributions, we study firm behavior under a strict liability rule in the presence of industry reputation effects. Our emphasis on industry (as opposed to firm-specific) reputation effects naturally leads to a focus on industry equilibrium and socially optimal industry configuration (as opposed to firm-specific equilibrium behavior). We analyze how industry reputation effects and the strict liability rule interact in determining the extent of alignment between industry equilibrium and the socially optimal industry structure with regard to investment in precaution. At a more general level, the importance of "collective reputations" has been emphasized by Tirole (1996) . 6 Tirole has shown that the phenomenon of collective reputation emerges when individual behaviors are imperfectly observed. Building on Tirole's insight, the industrial organization literature has studied the incentives of firms to provide quality when consumers observe only an industrywide signal about product quality, an environment leading to collective reputa-4 For early analyses and discussion of these issues in the context of products liability, see, e.g. Oi (1973) and Epple and Raviv (1978) . 5 Examining the impact of the extent of liability compensation, Baumann et al. (2011) study a model in which consumers cease to purchase products of firms which do not invest enough in accident prevention. 6 Levin (2009) develops a stochastic version of Tirole's (1996) model. tion effects (Winfree and McCluskey, 2005; Carriquiry and Babcock, 2007; Fleckinger, 2007; Rouviére and Saubeyran, 2011; McQuade et al., 2010; Pouliot and Sumner 2010) . 7 We, in contrast, address the problem of larger-scale, firmcaused accidents where victims are third parties (see Section 2) and examine how industry reputation effects, and their interaction with legal sanctions, shape firms' incentives to invest in precaution. Finally, our analysis illuminates two behavioral features that arise under industry reputation effects, but which have previously also been highlighted in other, unrelated legal settings. First, when bound by industry-wide reputation, an individual firm may be subject to (extra-legal) sanctions even when the firm did not commit social harm. In this sense, our analysis resonates with the portion of the law-and-economics literature that examines the consequences of errors in adjudication leading to individuals being found liable for acts they did not commit (see, e.g. Kaplow and Shavell, 1994; Shavell, 2004) . Second, we show that, in the presence of industry reputation effects, the fortitude of expected (extra-legal) sanctions sustained by an individual firm, and thus the firm's incentives to invest in precaution, crucially depends on the precaution-taking behavior of other firms in the industry. Our analysis hence echoes the strand of the law enforcement literature which has emphasized the importance of social context in examining an individual's decision to commit a wrongful act (see, e.g. Funk, 2006; Chang et al., 2000) .
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model's setup. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, characterize the industry equilibrium and socially optimal industry configuration in the presence of industry reputation effects. Section 5 examines how the relationship between the equilibrium and socially optimal industry configuration varies depending on the presence or absence of industry reputation effects and a liability regime in the form of the strict liability rule. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider an industry comprised of n > 2 identical firms.
8 Each firm conducts an activity which may lead to an accident causing social harm equal to H > 0. We think of this social harm as being non-negligible in magnitude and affecting 7 Landon and Smith (1998) provide empirical evidence on the role of collective reputation for consumer behavior. Fatas et al. (2010) propose a mechanism that ensures adherence to high quality in an environment where firms are subject to collective reputation. 8 For models of industry populated by ex ante identical firms, see, for example, d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) , Donsimoni et al. (1986) , Rogerson (1983), and Shaffer (1995) .
third parties, as would be the case, for example, in the occurrence of a power plant incident, a tanker oil spill, or a chemical disaster. The probability that a firm causes an accident in the absence of precaution equals P 2 0; 1 ð Þ. The firm, however, can eliminate the risk of an accident by investing in precaution.
9 Let the associated cost of precaution be C > 0. Firms' incentives to invest in precaution are shaped, first, by tort law. Under the strict liability rule, a firm is liable for payment of damage compensation whenever an accident occurs.
10 Let a firm's expected liability costs in the case of an accident equal L. L is the product of the probability that the firm is taken to court and found liable and the amount of damage compensation the firm has to pay (this may include punitive damages). When an accident in the industry can be perfectly traced back to the firm causing it, L may, in addition, also entail pecuniary losses due to diminished firmspecific reputation; since we want to emphasize the role of industry-wide reputation effects, however, we assume that any firm-specific reputation losses are negligible. 11 Given that accident-caused social harm may be considerable, we let L < H: firms may be judgment proof because of liability caps or insolvency (Shavell, 1984a (Shavell, , 1986 , all lawsuits need not take place even though harm has been done (DeGeest and Dari-Mattiacci, 2007; Shavell, 1984b) , and given the inherent incompleteness of law (Pistor and Xu, 2003) , a firm may escape liability even if taken to court. As we show in Section 5, the assumption that L < H implies that the regime of strict liability on its own need not induce socially optimal precaution. In addition to tort law, a firm's choice on whether to invest in precaution is influenced by actions taken by other firms in the industry because of industrywide reputation effects. Industry reputation effects arise when one firm's actions influence the observers' perceptions of the industry as a whole. We do not attempt to endogenize the emergence of a common, industry-wide reputation (see, e.g. Tirole, 1996; Levin, 2009) . Instead, we take the existence of industry-9 Allowing for an investment in precaution to merely reduce the likelihood of an accident (rather than entirely eliminate the risk of an accident taking place) complicates the algebra, but should not alter the main conclusions of our analysis, as long as industry-wide reputational losses occur only when accidents are caused by firms not investing in precaution. 10 The assumption that a firm can eliminate the risk of an accident by investing in precaution renders the strict liability rule equivalent to the negligence rule with a due standard of care set at C NG C. 11 That is, we could write L ¼ p Â q Â l þ r, where p is the probability that the firm is sued (conditional on experiencing an accident), q the probability that the firm is found liable, l the amount of damages determined by the court, and r firm-specific reputation loss. We assume that r is small.
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wide reputation as given and examine its repercussions: in the presence of a common industry-wide reputation, a firm's accident reflects negatively not only on the firm causing the accident but on the entire industry (see, e.g. King et al., 2002; Barnett, 2007; Barnett and King, 2008) . The presence of industry reputation effects, therefore, implies that firms in the industry are, unlike in the standard models of torts, interdependent.
We model industry reputation effects as follows. If k < n firms in the industry invest in precaution, the remaining m ¼ n À k firms are prone to causing an accident. Hence, the probability that exactly j 2 {0,1,…,m} accidents take place in the industry is
is the probability density function of a random variable following a binomial distribution characterized by m ¼ n À k independent (Bernoulli) trials with "success probability" P (see, e.g. Mood et al., 1974) .
Let ρ(j) be the ex post loss incurred by each firm in the industry due to diminished industry reputation if exactly j accidents occur in the industry. When an accident takes place and firms in the industry are bound by a common reputation, all firms suffer a loss because "[the public] may suddenly boycott all products or services of this type, communities may refuse to allow production facilities in their neighborhoods, [and] employees may be unwilling to work in these firms" (Barnett, 2007:6-7) . Given the variety of potential stakeholders involved, our approach is agnostic about the precise channel through which individual firms experience industry-wide reputational sanctions in the case of accidents.
To ensure tractability, we parameterize ρ(j) with the aim of capturing a scenario in which the ex post loss incurred by each firm in the industry due to diminished industry reputation satisfies the following empirically plausible criteria. First, the ex post loss incurred by each firm is monotonically increasing with the number of accidents j. Second, the ex post loss incurred by each firm increases with the number of accidents j initially at an increasing rate and eventually at a decreasing rate. 12 The convex portion of the firm's ex post loss function then highlights the public's and stakeholders' escalated behavioral response to a growing number of industry accidents, a conceivable scenario when social harm per accident is non-trivial and accidents challenge the industry's innocence. 13 The concave portion of the loss function captures the notion that the marginal ex post loss to each firm due to diminished industry reputation eventually diminishes with each additional accident -because a firm's financial losses are bounded by the present value of a firm's future earnings or profits, or perhaps because the public and industry stakeholders update their beliefs about the "normal" state of the world as the number of accidents continues to grow. Following the Occam's razor principle (lex parsimoniae), the simplest parameterization of ρ(j) which satisfies the above criteria and, at the same time, allows for tractability, is the following third-degree polynomial:
where ρ > 0. The resulting "S-shaped" ex post loss function ρ(j) is portrayed in Figure 1 . Clearly, there exist alternative, higher-order polynomial and other specifications of ρ(j) which would, conditional on appropriate parameter restrictions, also give rise to an S-shaped curve akin to that depicted in Figure 1 . All such alternative parameterizations, however, would yield qualitatively identical conclusions as those based on specification [2] and presented below.
14 The magnitude of the parameter ρ in eq.
[2] captures the strength of industry reputation effects. The strength of industry reputation effects depends on the ability of the outside observers to sanction the industry, which in turn varies with attributes of the stakeholders and properties of the industry under consideration. Ceteris paribus, "[m]ore numerous, distant, and heterogeneous stakeholders are less likely to coordinate their influence, and thus less likely to build into a sufficiently powerful … force to sway firm actions" (King et al., 2002:397) . Similarly, "[c]oncentrated industries may be able to use their market power to offset stakeholder action", and "industries in the early stages of the value chain may be less vulnerable to boycotts or other manifestations of stakeholder pressure, as their products and services are less visible and thus less subject to scrutiny" (King et al., 2002:398) .
When m ¼ n-k firms in the industry choose not to invest in precaution, the expected loss incurred by each firm in the industry due to diminished industry reputation therefore equals
where ρ(j) is given in eq.
[2]. Taking into account the properties of the binomial distribution, eq.
[3] can be written as (see Appendix):
The following result summarizes the key properties of R(m). (We relegate proofs of all results to the Appendix.)
where P is strictly increasing in n and P ! 1=2 as n ! 1;
With fewer firms investing in precaution, the expected number of accidents in the industry increases. Lemma 1 implies, first, that a firm's expected marginal loss because of diminished industry reputation (Δ R (m)) is always positive. Thus, a firm's expected loss because of diminished industry reputation (R(m)) is monotonically increasing in the number of firms in the industry that do not invest in precaution. Second, a firm's expected loss because of diminished industry reputation increases with the number of firms that do not invest in precaution initially at an increasing and eventually at a decreasing, rate.
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Finally, a firm's expected marginal loss because of diminished industry reputation (Δ R (m)) is strictly concave and attains maximum at m Ã < n if and only if the probability that a firm causes an accident in the absence of any precaution, P, exceeds the threshold level P (see Lemma 1, part (ii)) -an innocuous condition we assume is satisfied throughout the rest of our analysis. We emphasize that restricting our analysis in subsequent sections to the cases when P > P implies absolutely no loss of generality. Namely, when P P, Δ R (m) is monotonically increasing on the entire interval (0,n), a scenario which rules out the possibility of multiple industry equilibria (see Section 3, Proposition 1) and, hence, entails only a subset of possible qualitative outcomes that may arise when P > P.
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The above results together shape the nature of the industry equilibrium, as discussed in the following section.
Industry equilibrium
At the firm level, an investment in precaution is costly, but it eliminates the risk of an accident and thus the need to pay any compensation damages. At the same time, investing in precaution reduces the firm's expected costs due to industry reputation effects from
Þ other firms in the industry also invest in precaution. In contrast, not investing in precaution saves the firm the cost of precaution, but exposes the firm to the risk of causing an accident and of having to pay compensation damages. In addition, the decision to not invest in precaution increases the firm's expected 15 From part (ii) of Lemma 1, the inflection point of R(m) is at m ¼ ðn=2Þ À 1 ð Þ =P. 16 Letting P P, therefore, leads to qualitatively identical outcomes as when assuming that the ex post loss incurred by each firm in the industry due to diminished industry reputation (ρ(j)) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in the number of accidents j -a scenario we worked out in an early version of the article. A full proof of this point is available upon request. costs due to industry reputation effects from R(m) to R m þ 1 ð Þwhen m ¼ n À k other firms in the industry also do not invest in precaution.
In an environment with industry reputation effects, a firm's payoff from a given action, therefore, depends on the actions taken by other firms in the industry. Unlike in the traditional analyses of the problem of torts (see, e.g. Shavell, 2004 Shavell, , 2007 Cooter and Ulen, 2012; Miceli, 2008) , in our framework, firms in the industry are interdependent and each firm's decision on whether to invest in precaution is, therefore, inherently strategic (in game-theoretic sense).
We explore when a specific industry configuration, summarized by the number of firms that do not invest in precaution m ¼ n À k, is a strict Nash equilibrium of a static game with complete information in which firms simultaneously and independently choose whether to invest in precaution. Our notion of industry equilibrium, hence, resonates closely with the concept of cartel stability used in the industrial organization literature (see, e.g. d 'Aspremont et al., 1983; Donsimoni et al., 1986; Donsimoni, 1985; Shaffer, 1995; Nocke, 2002) .
Industry configuration such that all firms in the industry are investing in precaution (m ¼ 0) is a strict Nash equilibrium if no firm currently investing in precaution has an incentive to instead not invest in precaution, that is, if
The left-hand side of the inequality [5] is a firm's expected cost if the firm invests in precaution when all other firms in the industry also invest in precaution. The right-hand side of eq. [5] is the firm's expected cost if the firm chooses to not invest in precaution while all other firms in the industry invest in precaution. The inequality [5] can also be written as
According to expression [6] , if all other firms in the industry are investing in precaution, a firm's best response is to invest in precaution (as opposed to not invest in precaution) when the expected benefit in the form of decreased losses due to industry reputation effects Δ R ð0Þ ; Rð1Þ À Rð0Þ ð Þ outweighs the cost of precaution net of expected liability damages the firm would have to pay in the absence of precaution ðC À P Â LÞ.
Similarly, industry configuration with no firm in the industry taking precaution m ¼ n ð Þis a strict Nash equilibrium, if no firm has incentive to deviate and instead take precaution, that is, if
The left-hand side of inequality [7] is the firm's expected costs if the firm chooses to invest in precaution when the rest of the industry (ðn À 1Þ firms) is not investing in precaution. The right-hand side of inequality [7] is the firm's expected cost if the firm chooses not to invest in precaution when all other firms in the industry are also not investing in precaution. The inequality [7] can also be expressed as
Intuitively, if no other firm in the industry is investing in precaution, a firm's best response is to also not invest in precaution (as opposed to invest in precaution) when the expected benefit in the form of decreased losses due to industry reputation effects ðΔ R ðn À 1Þ ; RðnÞ À Rðn À 1ÞÞ is smaller than the cost of precaution net of expected liability damages the firm would have to pay in the absence of precaution ðC À P Â LÞ.
Finally, industry configuration with m 2 f1; . . . ; n À 1g firms not investing in precaution and k ¼ n À m firms investing in precaution is a strict Nash equilibrium if, first, every firm investing in precaution finds it optimal not to abandon investing in precaution, that is, when
or, equivalently, when
and, second, every firm not investing in precaution has no incentive to instead invest in precaution, that is, when
Industry configuration with m 2 f1; . . . ; n À 1g firms in the industry not investing in precaution and k ¼ n À m firms investing in precaution is, therefore, an equilibrium if m 2 f1; . . . ; n À 1g simultaneously satisfies conditions [9] [12] , is evidently not unique when it comes to the identity of specific firms that invest in precaution and those that do not invest in precaution. In fact, there are n m strict Nash equilibria for any given m 2 {1,…,n-1} that simultaneously satisfy conditions [9] and [11] . Because firms are identical, however, all of the equilibria for a given m 2 {1,…, n-1} imply qualitatively the same behavior and have the same welfare repercussions (see Proposition 2 and Section 5). We, thus, do not refer to this situation as one of "true" multiple equilibria (using the standard meaning of the phrase).
The following result, which follows immediately from the discussion above, summarizes the industry equilibrium for a given tort problem at hand.
Proposition 1: Let m IND be the (strict Nash) equilibrium number of firms that do not invest in precaution. 
Proposition 1 is illustrated graphically in Figure 2 .
18 As a rule of thumb, ceteris paribus, the larger the cost of precaution net of expected liability damages that the firm would have to pay in the absence of precaution ðC À P Â LÞ, the larger the number of firms that in equilibrium do not invest in precaution (i.e. the smaller the equilibrium number of firms investing in precaution). 
, when m-1 firms are not investing in precaution, the mth firm currently also not investing in precaution is better off deviating and instead investing in precaution. Similarly, with
ð Þ firms investing in precaution, the kth firm currently investing in precaution is better off deviating and instead not investing in precaution.
existence of an industry equilibrium where no firm invests in precaution -despite the fact that the cost of precaution net of expected liability damages ðC À P Â L > 0Þ is not prohibitively high -arises because a firm's ex post marginal loss due to diminished industry reputation eventually decreases with the number of accidents (see Figure 1) ; this in turn renders a firm's expected loss because of diminished industry reputation (R(m)) concave as the number of firms not investing in precaution increases. In this situation, if no other firm is choosing to invest in precaution, then even though the cost of precaution net of expected liability damages ðC À P Â L > 0Þ is relatively low, a firm faces strong incentives to likewise abstain from investing in precaution.
Social costs and socially optimal industry configuration
Social costs in our framework arise for three reasons. First, firms investing in precaution incur direct costs. When n À m ¼ k firms invest in precaution, the total costs of precaution amount to ðn À mÞ Â C. Second, with social harm per accident equal to H and with m ¼ n À k firms in the industry not investing in precaution, the expected social losses due to accident-caused harm equal where the right-hand side of eq.
[13] equals the left-hand side because of the properties of the binomial distribution (see Appendix). Third, expected industry-wide losses as a result of diminished industry reputation when m firms in the industry do not invest in precaution equal n Â R m ð Þ. From the general equilibrium viewpoint, the decrease in firms' profits due to diminished reputation in the industry under consideration may be, at least in part, offset by an increase in profits of firms in an industry offering related products (if any) toward which the public and stakeholders rationally re-direct their attention. The re-direction process, however, entails consumers incurring welfare-reducing switching costs (see, e.g. Klemperer, 1987 Klemperer, ,1988 and any industry employees seeking employment elsewhere (see, e.g. Barnett, 2007:7) incur labor market search costs. The losses in the industry hurt by diminished reputation are, therefore, never fully offset by any gains elsewhere in the economy. We, thus, let a proportion λ > 0 of the firms' aggregate expected losses from diminished industry reputation ðn Â RðmÞÞ amount to net expected social costs.
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The magnitude of the parameter λ can be thought of as capturing the extent of industry specificity. λ will be small (close to zero) in situations when, following social harm-inducing accidents, the public and industry stakeholders are able to re-direct their attention to another industry, which registers an increase in profits, at little cost. In contrast, λ will be comparatively larger in situations when there exist no, or very few, alternatives for the public and stakeholders of the industry experiencing socially harmful accidents.
With m ¼ n À k firms in the industry not investing in precaution, the total expected social costs (expected social costs, in short), therefore, equal
The following result summarizes the key properties of SC(m). 20 None of our results change if we instead assume that the next expected social costs due to industry reputation effects are proportional to R(m), rather than to nR(m).
Aggregate precaution costs ((n -m)C) and the expected social losses from accident-caused harm (mPH) are linear in the number of firms not investing in precaution. Because expected industry-wide losses due to diminished industry reputation (nR(m)) are initially convex and eventually concave in the number of firms not investing in precaution (see Lemma 1), the expected social costs SC(m) are also initially convex and eventually concave in the number of firms not investing in precaution (Lemma 2, part (ii)). Whether the expected social costs SC(m) are increasing or decreasing in the number of firms not investing in precaution, and whether that relationship is monotonic or non-monotonic, depends on the magnitude of the expected accident-related social harm ðP Â HÞ relative to the cost of precaution (C). If C < P Â H, it would have been socially optimal for all firms to invest in precaution in the absence of industry reputation effects. In the presence of industry reputation effects, therefore, expected social costs are monotonically increasing in the number of firms not investing in precaution (Lemma 2, part (i)). On the other hand, if C > P Â H, it would have been socially optimal for all firms to not invest in precaution in the absence of industry reputation effects. The presence of industry reputation effects gives rise to additional net social losses. With the marginal net expected social costs due to diminished industry reputation ðnλΔ R ðmÞÞ following an "inverted-U" shape -see Lemma 1 -the precise shape of the expected social costs function SC(m), therefore, depends on the magnitude of the expected accident-related social harm net of cost of precaution, C À P Â H > 0 (see Lemma 2). When C À P Â H > 0 is small, SC(m) increases. When C À P Â H > 0 is intermediate, SC(m) initially decreases and eventually increases. For even larger values of C À P Â H > 0, SC(m) likewise varies with m in a non-monotonic fashion, but in this case attaining both a local minimum and a local maximum on the interval (0,n). Finally, when C À P Â H > 0 is very large, SC(m) is monotonically decreasing.
Given the above considerations, the following result summarizes the socially optimal industry configuration in terms of the number of firms m ¼ n À k not investing in precaution.
Proposition 2: Let m SOC be the number of firms in the industry not taking precaution such that the social costs [14] are minimized. 
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(iv) If λnΔ R ðn À 1Þ < C À P Â H < λnΔ R m Ã ð Þ, then m SOC depends on the relative magnitude of C À P Â H > 0 as follows. When ðC À P Â HÞ À λnΔ R ðn À 1Þ > 0 is small, m SOC ¼ m þþ , where m þþ > m þ is an integer from the interval (0,m*) such that λnΔ R ðm þþ À 1Þ < C À P Â H < λnΔ R ðm þþ Þ. When
Proposition 2 is illustrated with Figure 3. (The shape of nλΔ R ðmÞ follows directly from the properties of Δ R (m) summarized in Lemma 1.) The larger the cost of precaution net of expected accident-related social harm caused by a firm in the absence of precaution ðC À P Â HÞ, the larger the number of firms that should, from the social welfare viewpoint, abstain from investing in precaution (and thus the smaller the socially desirable number of firms investing in precaution). Finally, to prepare the terrain for analysis in the following section, we highlight how the extent of industry specificity, as captured by λ, influences the relationship between private and social costs arising due to industry reputation effects. Recall that R(m), defined in expression [3] , is the firm's expected loss due to diminished industry reputation when m firms in the industry do not invest in precaution. The corresponding net social costs equal λnR m ð Þ.
21 We note that when λnΔ R ðn À 1Þ < C À P Â H < λnΔ R m 
Comparison of R(m) and λnRðmÞ reveals that there exists a critical value of λ, equal to n -1 , such that when the extent of industry specificity is high, so that λ > n À1 , net social costs arising from diminished industry reputation exceed corresponding private cost for a given m. Hence, the socially optimal industry configuration entails a larger number of firms investing in precaution than the industry equilibrium (i.e. m SOC < m IND ). Geometrically, this depicts a situation when the nλΔ R ðmÞ curve portrayed in Figure 3 lies above the Δ R (m) curve portrayed in Figure 2 . In contrast, when industry specificity is low, so that λ < n À1 , net social costs arising from diminished industry reputation are smaller than the corresponding private cost for a given m. However, because expected liability damages are also smaller than the expected accident-related social harm (L < H, see Section 2), the relationship between the socially optimal and the equilibrium number of firms investing in precaution is in general ambiguous (m SOC could be greater or smaller than m IND ). Geometrically, in this case, the nλΔ R ðmÞ curve portrayed in Figure 3 lies below the Δ R (m) curve portrayed in Figure 2 .
Equilibrium vs socially optimal industry configuration: comparative statics
The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 reveals that, for a given tort problem at hand, the equilibrium industry configuration, as captured by m IND (see Proposition 1), in general need not coincide with the socially optimal industry configuration, as captured by m SOC (see Proposition 2). We say that the equilibrium industry configuration and the socially optimal industry configuration are aligned whenever m IND ¼ m SOC , and misaligned when m IND Þm SOC . In this section, we examine how a liability regime and industry reputation effects -the two forces shaping the firms' incentives to invest in precautiondetermine whether the equilibrium industry configuration is aligned or misaligned with the socially optimal industry configuration. We first focus on the impact of industry reputation effects for a given liability regime (Section 5.1). We then explore the other aspect of the interaction between legal and industry-wide reputational sanctions: the impact of introduction of a strict liability rule given the presence of industry reputation effects (Section 5.2).
The presence or absence of a liability regime is under direct control of policymakers. In contrast, industry reputation effects are arguably less amenable to direct policy intervention (though public authorities could, for example, attempt to disseminate information about the industry to enhance coordination, and thus collective action, of various stakeholders). Nevertheless, an examination of the implications of the presence of industry reputation effects for a given liability regime illustrates how this particular type of non-legal sanctions influences industry behavior.
In Section 5, we focus on scenarios where there is a unique industry equilibrium both before and after the change of interest (i.e. the increase in strength of industry reputation effects or the introduction of strict liability). Emphasis on scenarios that feature unique industry equlibria allows us to deduce clear predictions for each comparative statics exercise. In the case of the impact of industry reputation effects (Section 5.1), the emphasis on equilibrium uniqueness is equivalent to letting industry reputation effects be substantial enough to actually change industry behavior vis-à-vis the scenario when there are no industry reputation effects. 22 In the case of the introduction of strict liability (Section 5.2), the emphasis on equilibrium uniqueness is tantamount to the policy intervention (increase in L) being substantial enough to unambiguously alter industry behavior. 
The impact of industry reputation effects
We first characterize equilibrium industry configuration and deduce its social welfare properties in a counterfactual environment in which there are no industry reputation effects, that is, the standard scenario examined in the literature (see, e.g. Shavell, 2004 Shavell, , 2007 Cooter and Ulen, 2012; Miceli, 2008) when each of the n firms optimally chooses whether to invest in precaution without any regard for the actions taken by other firms in the industry. In the absence of industry reputation effects (ρ ¼ 0 in eq.
[2] and, hence, ρ(j) ¼ 0 for all j), a firm will invest in precaution if and only if the cost of investing in precaution (C) is smaller than the firm's expected cost from not investing in precaution (P Â L). In contrast, from the social welfare point of view, a firm should invest in precaution if and only if the cost of investing in precaution is smaller than the expected social loss in the absence of precaution (P Â H). We, thus, have the following result 24 :
Lemma 3: In the absence of industry reputation effects (i.e. when ρ j ð Þ ¼ 0 for all j),
According to Lemma 3, in the absence of industry reputation effects, industry equilibrium coincides with the socially optimal industry configuration either when a firm's cost of precaution is small relative to the expected liability damages and the expected social costs or when the cost of precaution is large relative to both the expected social costs and the expected liability damages. In contrast, industry equilibrium does not coincide with the socially optimal industry configuration when the cost of precaution exceeds expected liability damages but is at the same time smaller than the expected social harm in the case of an accident.
We now examine how the existence of industry reputation effects shapes the relationship between the equilibrium and socially optimal industry configuration in the presence of a strict liability rule for a given tort problem under consideration.
In the scenario when, without industry reputation effects, all firms would have chosen to invest in precaution and the resulting configuration would have been socially optimal (C < P Â L < P Â H; see Lemma 3, part (i)), the presence of industry reputation effects merely increases a firm's incentive to invest in precaution. Industry equilibrium, therefore, involves all firms investing in precaution (see part (i) of Proposition 1).
Likewise, when the cost of precaution is smaller than the expected accidentrelated social harm (C < P Â H), social costs in the presence of industry reputation effects are increasing with the number of firms not investing in precaution (see Lemma 2, part (i)). Thus, the socially optimal industry configuration in the presence of industry reputation effects, much like in their absence, involves all firms investing in precaution (see Proposition 2, part (i)). We, therefore, have the following result, illustrated in Figure 4 : In contrast, in the scenario when, without industry reputation effects, no firm invests in precaution and the socially optimal industry configuration involves all firms investing in precaution (P Â L < C < P Â H; see Lemma 3, part (ii)), the presence of industry reputation effects may affect the alignment between the equilibrium and socially optimal industry configuration. With C < P Â H, much like in the scenario described by Proposition 3, the socially optimal industry configuration in the presence of industry reputation effects involves all firms investing in precaution (see Proposition 2, part (i)). The equilibrium industry configuration when C > P Â L, however, depends on the strength of industry reputation effects.
When industry reputation effects are weak (ρ is small, and thus Δ R (m) is small for a given m; see Lemma 1), quite plausibly C > P Â L þ Δ R m Ã ð Þ, in which case industry equilibrium is such that no firm invests in precaution (see Proposition 1, part (iv)). When C > P Â L þ Δ R m Ã ð Þ, industry reputation effects are too weak to steer the industry equilibrium toward the socially optimal industry configuration. However, when the strength of industry reputation effects increases (ρ increases, and thus Δ R (m) shifts upward for a given m; see Lemma 1), industry equilibrium involves an increasing number of firms taking precaution. In particular, when industry reputation effects are sufficiently strong so that C < P Â L þ Δ R ð0Þ, the industry equilibrium unambiguously involves all firms investing in precaution (see Proposition 1, part (i)), which in this case coincides with the socially optimal industry configuration. The above analysis leads to the following result suggesting a socially desirable role for industry-wide reputational effects, as illustrated in Figure 5 : Finally, we investigate the scenario when, without industry reputation effects, no firm invests in precaution and the resulting industry configuration is socially optimal (P Â L < P Â H < C; see Lemma 3, part (iii)). In this case, as we show below, the way that the presence of industry reputation effects shapes the industry equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration varies with the extent to which diminished industry reputation gives rise to net social costs, which in turn depends on the degree of industry specificity (see Section 4). Figure 5 : A scenario with P Â L < C < P Â H when the presence of industry reputation effects steers the industry equilibrium toward the socially optimal industry configuration. m SOC ¼ 0 both in the presence and in the absence of industry reputation effects. In the absence of industry reputation effects, m IND ¼ n. In the presence of industry reputation effects,
When industry specificity is high (i.e. when λ > n À1 ), so that diminished industry reputation gives rise to notable net social costs, the industry equilibrium in the presence of reputation effects in general involves fewer firms investing in precaution than what is socially desirable (m IND > m SOC ). 25 Intuitively, at the socially optimal number of firms not investing in precaution (m SOC ), the cost of precaution net of expected liability damages in the case of an accident is then greater than the increase in losses due to industry reputation effects if a firm chooses not to invest in precaution (C À P Â L > Δ R ðm SOC Þ). With n À ðm SOC þ 1Þ other firms investing in precaution, a firm investing in precaution thus has an incentive to abandon investing in precaution, implying that the (strict Nash) equilibrium m IND must exceed m SOC . Figure 6 illustrates this result.
In contrast, when the extent of industry specificity is low, so that diminished industry reputation gives rise to relatively small net social costs (i.e. when λ < n À1 ), industry equilibrium in the presence of industry reputation effects may in general involve either a smaller or a larger number of firms investing in precaution than the socially optimal industry configuration (see Section 4). Figure 7 , for example,
Figure 6: A scenario with P Â L < P Â H < C and λ > n À1 when the presence of industry reputation effects steers the industry equilibrium away from the socially optimal industry configuration. In the absence of industry reputation effects, m IND ¼ m SOC ¼ n. In the presence of industry reputation effects,
In the former case, all firms take precaution in the equilibrium and such an industry configuration is also socially optimal (m IND ¼ m SOC ¼ 0). In the latter case, no firm takes precaution in the equilibrium and such an industry configuration is also socially optimal (m IND ¼ m SOC ¼ n).
illustrates a scenario when, in the presence of industry reputation effects, industry equilibrium involves all firms investing in precaution (C À P Â L < Δ R ð0Þ; see Proposition 1, part (i)) while the socially optimal industry configuration requires that no firm invests in precaution (C À P Â H > nλΔ R ðm Ã Þ; see Proposition 2, part (v)).
Therefore, regardless of the extent to which diminished industry reputation translates into net social costs (i.e. the magnitude of λ), we have the following result in the scenario when, without industry reputation effects, no firm would have invested in precaution and the resulting industry configuration would have been socially optimal (P Â L < P Â H < C): In sum, Propositions 3-5 suggest that the impact of industry reputation effects is contingent on the nature of the particular tort problem at hand. Industry reputation effects have no impact on the alignment between the equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration when, in the absence of industry reputation effects, all firms would have invested in precaution and doing so would have been socially optimal (Proposition 3). The presence of industry reputation effects in this case merely strengthens both firms' incentives and the social desirability of investing in precaution. 
Model of Torts with Industry Reputation Effects
In contrast, industry reputation effects may align the equilibrium with the socially optimal industry configuration when, in the absence of industry reputation effects, the liability regime fails to incentivize firms to invest in precaution when it would have been socially optimal for all firms to invest in precaution (Proposition 4). The presence of industry reputation effects can, therefore, provide the missing incentives and thereby substitute for a suboptimal liability regime.
Finally, the presence of industry reputation effects is undesirable when it misaligns the equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration. This occurs when, in the absence of industry reputation effects, no firm would have had an incentive to invest in precaution and no firm investing in precaution would have been the socially optimal industry configuration (Proposition 5). In this situation, the presence of industry reputation effects alters both the industry equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration so that the former in general no longer coincides with the latter.
The impact of a strict liability rule
In the counterfactual scenario without a liability regime, a firm's expected liability damages equal zero: L ¼ 0. 26 We now investigate how, given industry reputation effects, the introduction of the strict liability rule L such that 0 < L < H (see Section 2) impacts the extent of alignment between the equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration.
In the presence of industry reputation effects, the socially optimal industry configuration entails all firms in the industry investing in precaution either when a firm's cost of precaution is smaller than the expected social harm from an accident (C < P Â H) or when a firm's cost of precaution exceeds the expected social harm from an accident (C > P Â H) and, at the same time, because of high industry specificity, diminished industry reputation leads to non-negligible net social costs (λ is sufficiently large); see Proposition 2. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate these scenarios.
When, for a given cost of precaution, the industry reputation effects are not excessively strong, the equilibrium industry configuration in the absence of a liability regime (L ¼ 0) under any of the above two scenarios, in contrast with 26 All of the qualitative conclusions of the analysis continues to hold if we instead let L ¼ r > 0 before the introduction of strict liability to allow for existence of positive (but limited) firmspecific reputation losses when a firm causes an accident. the socially optimal industry configuration, entails a strictly positive number of firms that do not invest in precaution (see Proposition 1, parts (ii)-(iv), setting L ¼ 0). Under these conditions, the introduction of a strict liability rule increases the incentives of firms to invest in precaution, and, as a consequence, possibly fully aligns industry equilibrium with the socially optimal industry configuration. This is illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 . We, thus, have the following result:
Proposition 6: In the presence of industry reputation effects, when either C < P Â H or when C > P Â H and λ > n À1 , the introduction of the strict liability rule may steer m IND toward m SOC when m IND and m SOC would have been misaligned in the absence of a liability regime.
When a firm's costs of precaution are greater than the expected social harm from an accident (C > P Â H) and, for a given strength of industry reputation effects, diminished industry reputation gives rise to relatively small net social costs (λ < n À1 ), the socially optimal industry configuration may entail a positive number of firms that abstain from investing in precaution: Under the above conditions, the introduction of a strict liability rule may increase the equilibrium number of firms investing in precaution, thereby steering industry equilibrium away from the socially optimal industry configuration. In particular, the implementation of a strict liability rule shifts the industry equilibrium toward a point when all firms invest in precaution (while the socially optimal industry configuration, in contrast, dictates that only k ¼ n-m 0 firms should be investing in precaution) when C À P Â L < Δ R ð0Þ (see Proposition 1, part (i)). Figure 10 portrays this scenario. We, therefore, have the following result:
Proposition 7: In the presence of industry reputation effects, when C > P Â H and λ < n À1 , the introduction of the strict liability rule may steer m IND away from m SOC when m IND and m SOC would have been aligned in the absence of a liability regime.
Observe that in the situation depicted by Figure 10 , the introduction of the strict liability rule in the absence of industry reputation effects would have had no effect: in the absence of industry reputation effects, since C > C À P Â L > 0, no firm would have invested in precaution with the strict liability rule in place or not, and, because C > P Â H, such an industry configuration would have been socially optimal. The effect of the strict liability rule identified in Proposition 7 is, therefore, crucially contingent on the presence of industry reputation effects. In sum, in the presence of industry reputation effects, the introduction of a strict liability rule may align industry equilibrium with the socially optimal industry configuration either when the expected accident-related social harm is large relative to the cost of precaution or when diminished industry reputation translates into sizeable net social costs (for example, because industry stakeholders face no or few alternatives due to high industry specificity). In such instances, in the absence of a liability regime, industry equilibrium may involve too few firms investing in precaution from the socially optimal point of view (see Proposition 6). The introduction of strict liability then complements industrywide reputational sanctions by providing firms with the missing precautiontaking incentives.
In contrast, when the costs of precaution are large in comparison to expected accident-related social harm and, at the same time, diminished industry reputation translates into relatively small net social costs (for example, because industry specificity is low and the public seeking alternatives incur low switching costs), the socially optimal industry configuration involves at most a fraction of firms investing in precaution. In this case, the presence of industry-wide reputational sanctions may, on its own, already be sufficient in providing the industry with adequate incentives to engage in socially optimal precaution-taking. As a consequence, by introducing further high-powered incentives, the introduction of a strict liability rule may push the industry equilibrium toward a socially suboptimal configuration where too many firms invest in precaution (see Proposition 7).
The preceding analysis assumes that the enactment of the law itself does not influence the magnitude of industry-wide reputational sanctions. However, the act of introduction of strict liability may plausibly be interpreted by the public as the authorities' condemnation of reckless industry actions. The law's enactment might therefore raise public awareness about the issue, and, by leading to more industry-wide boycotts in the case of firm accidents, increase the fortitude of industry-wide reputational sanctions. 27 What are the consequences of the introduction of strict liability when the law's enactment itself increases the strength of industry reputation effects? Consider first the scenario identified in Proposition 6. Holding all other assumptions of Proposition 6 constant, if the enactment of strict liability rule increases the strength of industry reputation effects, the introduction of strict liability further strengthens firms' incentives to invest in precaution. As a result, industry equilibrium shifts even more forcefully toward the socially optimal configuration where all firms are investing in precaution. (Graphically, in Figures 8 and 9 , as the C line switches to the C À P Â L line because of the introduction of strict liability, the Δ R (m) and nλΔ R ðmÞ curves shift upward.)
Now consider the scenario identified in Proposition 7. Holding all other assumptions of Proposition 7 constant, if the enactment of the law magnifies industry reputation effects, the introduction of strict liability again moves industry equilibrium toward one where all firms invest in precaution. However, the socially optimal industry configuration now changes as well. Net social costs, which arise due to diminished industry reputation, increase for any number of firms investing in precaution. The new socially optimal industry configuration thus naturally involves more firms (and if the increase in the magnitude of industry-wide reputational sanctions is sufficiently large, all firms) investing in precaution. (Graphically, in Figure 10 , as the C line switches to the C À P Â L line because of the introduction of strict liability, the Δ R (m) and nλΔ R ðmÞ curves shift upward. Thus, relative to the scenario after the introduction of strict liability identified in Figure 10 , m SOC decreases.) Hence, while industry equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration both change as a result of the law's enactment, equilibrium and socially optimal industry configuration may -unlike in the scenario identified in Proposition 7 and Figure 10 now coincide both before and after the introduction of strict liability. Therefore, when the enactment of strict liability magnifies the strength of industry-wide reputational sanctions, strict liability need not lead to a misalignment between the equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration.
Conclusions
When "one firm's actions influence the judgments observers make of another firm or an industry as a whole … the fates of firms in the industry are intertwined because all firms suffer when any firm engages in actions that damage the industry's shared reputation" (Barnett and King, 2008:1152) . As a result of "one firm's error … reflect[ing] negatively on its rivals", firms are "forced to concern themselves not only with their own conduct but also with that of their rivals" (Barnett, 2007:3) . The presence of industry reputation effects, therefore, generates firm interdependence, which in turn requires that the problem of torts be analyzed within a framework explicitly recognizing the strategic nature of firm behavior.
This article has developed a model of torts to examine how the presence of industry reputation effects shapes firms' decisions to invest in precaution reducing the likelihood of social harm. We have characterized industry equilibrium for a given tort problem at hand and contrasted it with the socially optimal industry configuration, as captured by the socially optimal number of firms investing in precaution. We have then analyzed how the interaction between industry reputation effects and strict liability shapes the alignment between the industry equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration.
Firms within an industry being "tarred by the same brush" may under some circumstances substitute for a suboptimal liability regime by steering industry equilibrium toward the socially optimal industry configuration when industry equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration would have been misaligned in the absence of industry reputation effects. Under other circumstances, however, the presence of industry reputation effects misaligns the equilibrium and the socially optimal industry configuration when the two would have been aligned in the absence of industry reputation effects.
The impact of introducing a liability regime in the presence of industry reputation effects is likewise contingent on the specifics of the tort problem at hand. While the introduction of a strict liability rule may steer the industry equilibrium toward the socially optimal industry configuration under some circumstances, under other circumstances, it may push the industry equilibrium away from the socially desirable outcome.
This article is the first to analytically characterize industry equilibrium and its welfare consequences, and to conduct comparative statics, in the context of torts in the presence of industry reputation effects. To this end, we have deliberately kept our framework simple. We have, for example, modeled industry reputation effects by parameterizing a firm's industry reputation-related ex post costs as a function of industry-wide accidents. Future work building on our analysis could attempt to derive firm's costs due to industry reputation effects by explicitly modeling the reaction of heterogeneous industry stakeholders and the public to firm accidents, including their capacity to overcome collective action problems. A further extension of our model may examine a setting with heterogeneous firms and perhaps additionally consider the possibility of entry and exit; such an extension may generate interesting dynamics between a dominant firm and members of a competitive fringe. Finally, a richer model with a continuous choice of investment in precaution, and the associated continuous dependence of the accident probability on precaution, would allow for a meaningful comparison of the strict liability rule with the negligence rule in the presence of industry reputation effects.
28
In the presence of industry reputation effects, firms may take further actions to attempt to escape the common fate. To differentiate themselves from their rivals, firms can actively engage in a process of "preferential detachment" (Yu et al., 2008) , which may include adoption and enforcement of self-regulatory standards (see, e.g. King et al., 2002; Barnett, 2007; Barnett and King, 2008; Pouliot and Sumner, 2010) . Future work could, therefore, also extend our analysis to examine the reasons for, and repercussions of, such "institutionalized" strategic responses of industry participants in the presence of common reputation effects, as well as the interaction of these "private order" institutional solutions with the functioning of tort law and government-imposed regulations. where X is a random variable following a binomial distribution with m ; n À k independent (Bernoulli) trials with success probability P, and thus E[X] ¼ mP (see, e.g. Mood et al., 1974; Papoulis and Pillai, 2002) 
